Senate Confirmation Battles--Pining for the Good Old Days?

As reported by Erin Miller at SCOTUSBlog, the committee vote on Elena Kagan's Supreme Court nomination has been delayed until next week, ostensibly to provide additional time for senators to parse her written responses.  I suppose that's little enough to ask in exchange for a most prestigious job for life, but color me cynical.  No matter what the answers say, we will be treated to senators in front of television cameras opining that the same person is either an insufferable "judicial activist" or unsurpassed "legal scholar," and one already knows which senators will hold which view.  One suspects, therefore, that ideology has become disconnected from reality, no matter which ideology is held.

The cynic amongst us, therefore, would say that senate confirmation hearings are nothing more than an empty Kabuki dance--and that with bad dancers.  All the players assume their accustomed rolls and say their accustomed lines while performing their accustomed movements.

The high minded might counter that the Senate has a constitutional obligation to carry out as part in the separation of powers--at its height to save The Republic from life tenured legislators run amok.

Presumably, that is why the language of the high minded can become so heated, to wit, this statement about The President's nominee:

It is one of the deepest wounds that I have ever had as an American and a lover of the Constitution and a believer in progressive conservatism, that such a person could be put in the Court, as I believe she is likely to be. She is a muckraker, an emotionalist for her own purposes, a socialist, prompted by jealousy, a hypocrite, a person who has certain high ideals in her imagination, but who is utterly unscrupulous, in method in reaching them, a person of infinite cunning. . . . of great tenacity of purpose, and, in my judgment of much power for evil.  

I mean, if half of that were true, who would nominate (much less confirm) such a scoundrel?  But can even half of it be true?  And have we now made such a mess of the confirmation process that such incivility occurs without condemnation? 

But don't answer yet.

That statement is not about President Obama's nominee.  And the nominee was not even a woman.  I cheated.  I changed the gender in the quote. 

The quote is about President Wilson's nominee.  And the nominee's name was Louis Brandeis. 

Yes, that Louis Brandeis

The person who hurled such calumnies at the future Justice Brandeis was William Howard Taft, who probably wanted the appointment for himself and who later served as Chief Justice on the same court with this Brandeis "muckraker." 

And yet The Republic managed to survive the muckraking creator of the Erie Doctrine.  (The Republic has, to date, always done so).

The point: we've been doing confirmation wrong for a long time.  The amount of wrongness just waxes and wanes with the political temperatures of the times.

But it is still wrong, even if well-established wrong.  And it is a wrong lawyers have special responsibility to address.  Ours is the job of promoting respect for the judiciary, even a judiciary with which we sometimes disagree. 

How would this process look if self-serving Senators were held accountable by members of the bar in their states?  And I wonder, do we lawyers have the judgment to recognize opportunistic Kabuki dancing, even when committed by those of our own political stripe?

We now return you to our regularly scheduled appellate blog.

Conkright v. Frommert: Supreme Court Takes An ERISA Mulligan (Again)

A mulligan, in a game, happens when a player gets a second chance to perform a certain move or action. The practice is also sometimes referred to as a "do-over."

--Wikipedia

Alas, dear reader.  Here is where you get to find out what an ERISA geek I am.  I've worked in this area since about 1998, that fateful weekend when I made a note book of all the Supreme Court ERISA cases and studied them.  

'Cuz that's how I roll.

So, imagine how my heart went pitter pat when the Supreme Court released Conkright v. Frommert a few weeks ago and delved into the "abuse of discretion" standard of review for ERISA benefit determinations.

(Just a minute.  I need to take a moment to gather myself.  I'm all verklempt.  Talk amongst yourselves.)

Conkright is a lesson in how loose lips from prior opinions sink ships for clients and counsel looking for legal standard they can follow.  More precisely, it is a lesson in how mushy judicial language and multi-prong balancing tests create problems -- lawsuits born of ambiguity -- that some later court has to clean up.

After the jump, I'll explain why Conkright is an ERISA Mulligan that was needed to clean up its prior, imprecise opinion.  And as a bonus, I'll explain that it's at least the second such Mulligan the Supreme Court has needed in this area. 

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Kawasaki v. Beloit Corp.: Don't Leave The Reader In Suspense

Monday's Supreme Court opinions, ably reported by Erin Miller at SCOTUSBLOG, were . . . how does one say it . . . underwhelming. 

There I sat with my vuvuzela and SCOTUS face paint waiting on Bilski and waiting to see if the Fourteenth Amendment protects me from having the City of Chicago pry my guns from my cold dead fingers, and what do I get?

Who knew?  Like you, I was gobsmacked.

But separate from the legal issues involved, I noticed something about the legal writing that pushed my buttons--indeed a HUGE pet peeve with me.  So consider yourself warned, SCOTUS.  Consider this post a wag of my prodigious, blogger finger.

After the jump, your humble blogger will demonstrate why Supreme Court Opinions are no place for prospective suspense writers.  Just tell us, "whodunit."

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Krupski v. Costa Crociere: A Cert-Worthy Slip & Fall?

Procedure geeks were all a-twitter (again) when the Supreme Court released it's recent Krupski opinion.  And who can blame them?  The Supreme Court construed FRCP 15(c)(1)(C) on when correcting the misnomer of a party will relate back to the filing of an original complaint.

Essentially Krupski sued the marketing affiliate (Costa Cruise) when it was clear she had intended to sue the affiliate that actually operated the boat that tripped her (Costa Crociere).  By the time she got it all sorted out, limitations had run.  The Supreme Court saved her.

Eccitante!  No?

Kevin Russell of the SCOTUS Blog wrote a good summary and I won't repeat it.  But I was wondering about something else. 

I was wondering how a case that is essentially a slip and fall on a cruise ship made it to the Supreme Court of the United States.  I wish I could peer inside the black box of the Supreme Court "cert. pool" to know what made this case rise above other worthy cases that the Court rejected, if only for lack of time.

Justice Sotomayor's opinion says the court "granted certiorari to resolve tension among the Circuits over the breadth of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) . . . ."  She sets out a footnote of cases far less profound than a magnificent, circuit split.  Then she explicitly disavows any warranty of the extent to which they conflict, saying "We express no view on whether these decisions may be reconciled with each other in light of their specific facts and the interpretation of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) we adopt today."

So . . . "tension?"  That's enough?  Or is this different because it is a rule of procedure?  Absolute uniformity is more important with procedure and tension will suffice?  You SCOTUS wonks out there who have any thoughts feel free to weigh in.  I'm genuinely curious if this fits in any pattern or is just an outlier that the court reached out to grab. 

Supreme Court Update: A Tale of Three Statutes

The Supreme Court released three opinions Monday that would be of interest to civil practitioners:

The three cases are a tale of three different federal statutes, to which the Court (of necessity) had to apply three entirely different methods of statutory construction.

Hardt (pdf) involved ERISA, a detailed statute from the early 1970s to which Justice Thomas gave a familiar, modern and literalistic construction to Congress' language:

Whether § 1132(g) limits the availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” is a question of statutory construction. As in all such cases, we begin by analyzing the statutory language, “assum[ing] that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” . . .  We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its terms. . . .
* * *
The words “prevailing party” do not appear in this provision. Nor does anything else in §1132(g)(1)’s text purport to limit the availability of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party.” Instead, §1132(g)(1) expressly grants district courts “discretion” to award attorney’s fees “to either party."

In contrast, American Needle (pdf) involved the Sherman Act, dating from the dawn of time, containing language so broad that Justice Stevens rightly acknowledged that it could not be construed literally in light of the problems that would follow:

Taken literally, the applicability of §1 to “every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” could be understood to cover every conceivable agreement, whether it be a group of competing firms fixing prices or a single firm’s chief executive telling her subordinate how to price their company’s product. But even though, “read literally,” §1 would address “the entire body of private contract,” that is not what the statute means.

Finally, Lewis (pdf) involved Title VII.  While Justice Scalia acknowledged that application of Congress' language created "practical problems" and "puzzling results," he stated that it was not the job of the courts to worry about such things:

[I]t is not our task to assess the consequences of each approach and adopt the one that produces the least mischief. Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted. By enacting §2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i), Congress allowed claims to be brought against an employer who uses a practice that causes disparate impact, whatever the employer’s motives and whether or not he has employed the same practice in the past. If that effect was unintended, it is a problem for Congress, not one that federal courts can fix.

Three statutes and three completely different approaches to statutory construction--all on the same day. 

Salazar v. Buono: Something Only A Lawyer Could Believe

I can no longer find the quote, but I heard it said somewhere that the definition of a "legal fiction" is "something only a lawyer could believe."  I could not avoid that impression upon reading Salazar v. Buono (pdf), decided Tuesday by the Supreme Court of the United States. 

At issue?  According to Justices Kennedy and Alito: two lengths of four inch pipe, painted white and arranged in the shape of a cross, erected 10 miles from the nearest highway in a portion of the Mojave desert owned by the federal government that exceeded the combined area of the Nation's five smallest states and that was "likely . . . seen by more rattlesnakes than humans." The pipe sparked four lower court opinions to the effect that such pipes "establish" a religion, which, once established could not be cured by Congress passing a law to transfer the land into private hands for continued maintenance as a monument to "the Great War."

Why?  According to Justice Scalia: Because Mr. Buono was "deeply offended by the display of a Latin Cross on government-owned property" but had "no objection to Christian symbols on private property."

Hemmed in as they were by Mr. Buono's first final judgment, for which Supreme Court review was never sought, the Supreme Court could not reach the merits of whether such a display "established" a religion or whether Mr. Buono's "deep offense" was a sufficient injury to "make a federal case" out of it.  Nevertheless, the Court devoted 71 pages of judicial contretemps in six opinions concerning whether Mr. Buono's Constitutional right not to be "deeply offended" survived the Congressional transfer of the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. 

And they remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the transfer of the land with the lengths of four inch pipe.

Now, don't get me wrong.  I don't discount real establishment clause issues as unimportant or simplistic.    I was at just such an argument the very day this case came out.  But is Buono how we should be expending our judicial resources as Plaintiffs or as Defendants or as Courts?  Especially in a case where no Establishment Clause precedent is even possible?

Chief Justice Roberts' concurring opinion said it best.  This is not surprising, because it was also the shortest.  I reproduce it here in full:

At oral argument, respondent’s counsel stated that it “likely would be consistent with the injunction” for the Government to tear down the cross, sell the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and return the cross to them,with the VFW immediately raising the cross again. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. I do not see how it can make a difference for the Government to skip that empty ritual and do what Congress told it to do—sell the land with the cross on it. “The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows.” Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867).

(Emphasis added).

For all the post-opinion-learned-head-cogitation on my television, there is very little "there" there.  Whether one's own culture war scruples emphasize "establishment" or "free exercise," the substance of those protections is cheapened for both sides when the alleged injury and the substantive controversy are something only a lawyer could believe. 

Hertz Corp. v. Friend--How Judges Think

In the first post on this topic, I set out the basics of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Hertz Corp. v. Friend (pdf).  In the second post, I stuck my nose in and graded Justice Breyer's legal writing, rewriting the opinion and reducing its length by about 25%.  In this post, your humble servant gives a hypothesis on how four words could become so confusing. 

In 1958, Congress defined a corporation’s citizenship as the state of its incorporation as well as the state where it had its “principal place of business.” Although those four words do not appear unduly complicated, a half century later there was no clear test for what those words meant, and the leading treatise on Federal Practice and Procedure had to devote 73 footnote-encrusted pages to elucidating what those words meant. And the differences between the circuits were not so much a “circuit split” as a “circuit mashup.”

So how do we get to such a state, where lower courts are all over the map and such a key statute goes a half century in need of construction? Well, some would blame the limitless ingenuity of defense lawyers trying to get to federal court. 

Being a defense lawyer of limitless ingenuity who is fond of federal court, I reject such an insinuation. I will blame the judges. 

But don’t worry. I have Judge Posner on my side. After the jump you’ll see how judges think and why oversight of judicial decisions promotes administrative clarity.

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Hertz Corp. v. Friend--When School Marms Attack

Imagine the reception you would get at oral argument if you answered a question from the court by stating, “Well, your honor, two hundred and twenty years ago, in 1789, the Congress passed the First Judiciary Act, a completely different statute that has since been repealed, but that’s where I’d like to begin in answering the Court’s question.” 

If there is such a thing as the judicial “Nuclear Option,” one might expect it to be used. Judges still young enough to vault over the bench might consider it.  Others not quite so spry would press the panic button and call the marshals. But if you were in the Supreme Court of the United States, you’d be well within your rights to complain, “Hey, wait a minute. You started it!” 

After the jump, find out if it really is the Court’s fault, and in a fit of WASPish chutzpah, I will edit the court’s recent opinion in Hertz Corp. v. Friend (pdf) in an effort to improve upon it.

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Supreme Court Rule Revisions

Hat tip to Adam Schlossman over at the SCOTUSblog, to which I am daily drawn like moth to flame, for his concise post summarizing revisions to the Supreme Court Rules.  You can also read the Court's own memorandum (pdf) concerning the new rule changes.

Here, in the sidebar of the Appellate Record, you can also find:

More fun than a lawyer ought to be allowed to have.

Hertz Corp. v. Friend--The Basics

On February 23, 2010, law professors and Fed Court wonks the world over were observed in giddy and somewhat unseemly displays of enthusiasm for the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hertz Corporation v. Friend (pdf). Allow me to join the fray, because it is not often that federal practitioners get a new case necessitating republication of an entire volume of Federal Practice and Procedure.

In Hertz, the Court held that you can chuck volume 13F of Wright and Miller (really, go ahead) because a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state where it is incorporated as well as state where the boss’s office or the “nerve center” is located.

After the jump, analysis, the court’s holding, and a challenge. 

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Supreme Court Alert [March 8, 2010]

The Supreme Court released an opinion of interest to civil practitioners today, in particular attorneys who provide bankruptcy counseling.

In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz  v. United States, the Court held that such bankruptcy professionals are “debt relief agenc[ies]” under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) and must comply with the act's disclosure requirements as well as its prohibitions on counseling a person to "load up" with debt in advance of filing for bankruptcy protection.