Senate Confirmation Battles--Pining for the Good Old Days?

As reported by Erin Miller at SCOTUSBlog, the committee vote on Elena Kagan's Supreme Court nomination has been delayed until next week, ostensibly to provide additional time for senators to parse her written responses.  I suppose that's little enough to ask in exchange for a most prestigious job for life, but color me cynical.  No matter what the answers say, we will be treated to senators in front of television cameras opining that the same person is either an insufferable "judicial activist" or unsurpassed "legal scholar," and one already knows which senators will hold which view.  One suspects, therefore, that ideology has become disconnected from reality, no matter which ideology is held.

The cynic amongst us, therefore, would say that senate confirmation hearings are nothing more than an empty Kabuki dance--and that with bad dancers.  All the players assume their accustomed rolls and say their accustomed lines while performing their accustomed movements.

The high minded might counter that the Senate has a constitutional obligation to carry out as part in the separation of powers--at its height to save The Republic from life tenured legislators run amok.

Presumably, that is why the language of the high minded can become so heated, to wit, this statement about The President's nominee:

It is one of the deepest wounds that I have ever had as an American and a lover of the Constitution and a believer in progressive conservatism, that such a person could be put in the Court, as I believe she is likely to be. She is a muckraker, an emotionalist for her own purposes, a socialist, prompted by jealousy, a hypocrite, a person who has certain high ideals in her imagination, but who is utterly unscrupulous, in method in reaching them, a person of infinite cunning. . . . of great tenacity of purpose, and, in my judgment of much power for evil.  

I mean, if half of that were true, who would nominate (much less confirm) such a scoundrel?  But can even half of it be true?  And have we now made such a mess of the confirmation process that such incivility occurs without condemnation? 

But don't answer yet.

That statement is not about President Obama's nominee.  And the nominee was not even a woman.  I cheated.  I changed the gender in the quote. 

The quote is about President Wilson's nominee.  And the nominee's name was Louis Brandeis. 

Yes, that Louis Brandeis

The person who hurled such calumnies at the future Justice Brandeis was William Howard Taft, who probably wanted the appointment for himself and who later served as Chief Justice on the same court with this Brandeis "muckraker." 

And yet The Republic managed to survive the muckraking creator of the Erie Doctrine.  (The Republic has, to date, always done so).

The point: we've been doing confirmation wrong for a long time.  The amount of wrongness just waxes and wanes with the political temperatures of the times.

But it is still wrong, even if well-established wrong.  And it is a wrong lawyers have special responsibility to address.  Ours is the job of promoting respect for the judiciary, even a judiciary with which we sometimes disagree. 

How would this process look if self-serving Senators were held accountable by members of the bar in their states?  And I wonder, do we lawyers have the judgment to recognize opportunistic Kabuki dancing, even when committed by those of our own political stripe?

We now return you to our regularly scheduled appellate blog.

What If You Filed A Lawsuit And Nobody Came: Comer v. Murphy Oil USA

Did you notice when the Fifth Circuit ceased to be?

Let me explain.

No, let me sum up.

The Fifth Circuit ceased to exist for one particular case.  The result was a non-en-banc en banc reversal of the panel opinion, and the non-affirmance affirmance of the the district court opinion. 

I am referring to Comer v. Murphy Oil.  The District Court dismissed the case holding that hurricane victims could not sue the military industrial complex for worsening their hurricane damage by contributing to global warming.

A panel of the Fifth Circuit held, "yes you can."

The en banc court said, "no you can't"

Except it didn't.  Well, kinda.  After the jump, an explanation and a recommendation. 

Continue Reading...

Salazar v. Buono: Something Only A Lawyer Could Believe

I can no longer find the quote, but I heard it said somewhere that the definition of a "legal fiction" is "something only a lawyer could believe."  I could not avoid that impression upon reading Salazar v. Buono (pdf), decided Tuesday by the Supreme Court of the United States. 

At issue?  According to Justices Kennedy and Alito: two lengths of four inch pipe, painted white and arranged in the shape of a cross, erected 10 miles from the nearest highway in a portion of the Mojave desert owned by the federal government that exceeded the combined area of the Nation's five smallest states and that was "likely . . . seen by more rattlesnakes than humans." The pipe sparked four lower court opinions to the effect that such pipes "establish" a religion, which, once established could not be cured by Congress passing a law to transfer the land into private hands for continued maintenance as a monument to "the Great War."

Why?  According to Justice Scalia: Because Mr. Buono was "deeply offended by the display of a Latin Cross on government-owned property" but had "no objection to Christian symbols on private property."

Hemmed in as they were by Mr. Buono's first final judgment, for which Supreme Court review was never sought, the Supreme Court could not reach the merits of whether such a display "established" a religion or whether Mr. Buono's "deep offense" was a sufficient injury to "make a federal case" out of it.  Nevertheless, the Court devoted 71 pages of judicial contretemps in six opinions concerning whether Mr. Buono's Constitutional right not to be "deeply offended" survived the Congressional transfer of the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. 

And they remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the transfer of the land with the lengths of four inch pipe.

Now, don't get me wrong.  I don't discount real establishment clause issues as unimportant or simplistic.    I was at just such an argument the very day this case came out.  But is Buono how we should be expending our judicial resources as Plaintiffs or as Defendants or as Courts?  Especially in a case where no Establishment Clause precedent is even possible?

Chief Justice Roberts' concurring opinion said it best.  This is not surprising, because it was also the shortest.  I reproduce it here in full:

At oral argument, respondent’s counsel stated that it “likely would be consistent with the injunction” for the Government to tear down the cross, sell the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and return the cross to them,with the VFW immediately raising the cross again. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. I do not see how it can make a difference for the Government to skip that empty ritual and do what Congress told it to do—sell the land with the cross on it. “The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows.” Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867).

(Emphasis added).

For all the post-opinion-learned-head-cogitation on my television, there is very little "there" there.  Whether one's own culture war scruples emphasize "establishment" or "free exercise," the substance of those protections is cheapened for both sides when the alleged injury and the substantive controversy are something only a lawyer could believe. 

Now We're Getting Somewhere

Several weeks ago, a post here on TXI Transportation v. Hughes (pdf) made mention of the fact that a majority of our current Supreme Court of Texas would not have had opportunity to serve at the time of that court's 1889 opinion, Moss v. Sanger, condemning appeals to racial animus in arguments to the jury.

Something just as cool happened this week.  John Council of the Texas Lawyer Blog noted:

. . . Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson was traveling yesterday and could not be at oral arguments. So, by tradition, the most senior justice on the court took his spot in presiding over the first case on the docket. Since Justice Nathan Hecht, the high court’s longest- serving justice, recused himself from hearing TGS- NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Susan Combs, et al., the job of presiding over the court fell to the next most senior justice, Harriet O’Neill. O’Neill says she didn’t realize it at the time, but it was a historic moment. A woman has not presided over the Texas Supreme Court since 1925, when Gov. Pat Neff appointed an all-woman court. . . .

But the really really cool part is that it happened as a matter of course and nobody noticed until after the fact.  Justice Harriet O'Neill just happened to be the senior justice on duty, and she just did her job, as she has been doing since 1999.  John Council quotes Justice O'Neill:

Isn’t that amazing? I didn’t even think about it,” . . . .

Now we're getting somewhere--when the "right thing" that used to be so hard to do or so exceptional or so controversial becomes so accepted that it happens without a thought.  Nice.